. We consider the modality "ϕ is true in every σ-centered forcing extension", denoted ϕ, and its dual "ϕ is true in some σ-centered forcing extension", denoted ♦ϕ (where ϕ is a statement in set theory), which give rise to the notion of a principle of σ-centered forcing. We prove that if ZFC is consistent, then the modal logic of σ-centered forcing, i.e. the ZFC-provable principles of σ-centered forcing, is exactly S4.2. We also generalize this result to other related classes of forcing.
I
Modal logic is used to formalize various modalities appearing in language, the most common of which are the notions of possibility and necessity (alethic modalities), but also temporal modalities such as "always", doxastic modalities such as "believes" and many more. Given a certain formal language for modal logic, one can adjoin an intended interpretation to the modal operators, and with this intended interpretation in mind, find the right modal theory to fit one's needs. Besides these meta-theoretical semantics, modal logic has a few formal semantics, the most prominent of which is the "possible worlds semantics", or Kripke semantics, which give formal meaning to the intuition that something is possible if "it is true in some possible alternative world", and necessary if "it is true in all possible worlds". These semantics are based on the so-called Kripke models, which consist of a set of "worlds", related by an "accessibility relation" where a statement is possible in some world if there is a world accessible to it where the statement is true; and similarly, a statement is necessary if it is true in all accessible worlds. These semantics are highly reminiscent of the situation in set-theoretic forcing, where we have models of set-theory, related to one another by the relation of "being a forcing extension". This suggest a forcing interpretation of modal logic, where a statement is said to be possible, or forceable, if it is true in some forcing extension (of the universe), and necessary if it is true in all forcing extensions. This interpretation was first suggested by Joel Hamkins in [4] , where he used it to formalize a new forcing axiom called the "Maximality Principle" (MP). With this interpretation in place, the question arose -what modal theory best captures this interpretation? In other words -what is the "Modal Logic of Forcing"? This question actually splits into two -first, what modal principles of forcing are provable in ZFC? And second, given a specific model of ZFC, what are the modal principles true in it? These questions were formally asked by Hamkins and Benedikt Löwe in [6] , where they answered the first question by showing that the ZFC-provable principles of forcing are exactly the modal theory known as S4.2 (see below). They also began addressing the second question, by showing, e.g., that the modal principles true in any specific model contain S4.2 and are contained in S5, and that both ends of the spectrum are realized (by L on one hand and by Hamkins's model for the Maximality Principle on the other). Another related question is -what happens if we consider only a specific class of forcing notions, such as the class of all c.c.c forcings? This question was addressed more extensively in [5] , where it was shown, e.g., that the ZFC-provable principles of collapse forcing are exactly S4. 3 . In this work we continue this line of inquiry, with respect to the class of all σ-centered forcing notions. Thus, the main result of this work is that the modal logic of σ-centered forcing is exactly the modal theory S4.2. After establishing this main theorem, we show that the techniques developed here can be adjusted to other related classes of forcing notions.
We begin by setting some preliminaries -first we cite common definitions and theorems of forcing and of modal logic; and then present the main tools developed in [6, 5] for the research of the modal logic of forcing; we add one new notion to this set of tools, the notion of an n-switch, and show it's utility. Then we present the class of σ-centered forcing, prove some of its properties which give us the easy part of the theorem -that the modal logic of σ-centered forcing contains S4.2, and present the technique of coding subsets using σ-centered forcing. The hard part of the main theorem will be proved in section 4, where we begin by defining a specific model of ZFC, and then present two forcing constructions that would allow us to establish that the modal logic of σ-centered forcing is contained in S4.2. We conclude with the above-mentioned generalizations and some open questions.
P
We begin by presenting some notations and background that will be used in this work.
2.1. Forcing. Our forcing notation will usually follow Kunen's [10, chapter VII] . A poset P = (P, ≤) will usually be confused with it's underlying set. We say that p is stronger than q, or p extends q, if p ≤ q. Unless stated otherwise, every poset is assumed to have a unique maximal element, denoted ½ P or just ½ if the context is clear. We denote compatible elements by p q and incompatible by p⊥q. We usually denote P-names by letters τ, σ etc., or with a dot -ẋ. The canonical names for elements of the ground model are denoted by "check" -x. For a model M , we will sometimes denote by M P just any generic extension of M by a P-generic filter.
In this work, Cohen forcing C is the poset ω <ω , where s ≤ t iff t is an initial segment of s (denoted t s). We denote the length of s ∈ ω <ω by ℓ (s). If G ⊆ C is a generic filter, then f = G is in ω ω and is called a Cohen generic real. Any real r ∈ ω ω is called Cohen generic if there is some generic H ⊆ C such that r = H. This means that r is generic if every dense open set in ω <ω meets some finite initial segment of r. We can extend the notion of "dense-open set" to ω ω :
Definition 2.1.
(1) A basic open set (in ω ω ) is a set of the form U s := {x ∈ ω ω | s x} for some s ∈ ω <ω ; (2) A set U ⊆ ω ω is open if for every x ∈ U there is some s ∈ ω <ω such that x ∈ U s ⊆ U ; (3) A set D ⊆ ω ω is dense if it meets every basic-open set.
A real r is Cohen generic over a model M if it is in any open dense subset of ω ω in M .
Modal logic.
We provide a short account of modal logic based on [2] . The reader who is familiar with modal logic may wish to skip to definition 2.2. We work with propositional modal logic, in which formulas are constructed from propositional variables p, q, r . . . or p 0 , p 1 , . . . ; the logical connectives -∧, ∨, ¬, →, ↔; and two unary operators -, ♦. For a formula ϕ, ϕ is read "box ϕ" or "necessarily ϕ" and ♦ϕ is read "diamond ϕ" or "possibly ϕ". Unlike classical propositional logic, in modal logic there are many possible axiomatic systems resulting in different modal theories. A modal theory is a set of modal formulas containing all classical tautologies and closed under the deduction rules modus pones (from ϕ and ϕ → ψ deduce ψ) and necessitation (from ϕ, deduce ϕ), and under uniform substitution. We will focus on the modal theory S4.2 obtained from the following axioms:
by closing under the deduction rules. Our semantics for modal logic are based on the notion ot a Kripke model -a triplet M = W, R, V where W is a non-empty set, R is a binary relation on W and V a function from the propositional variables to subsets of W . Elements of W are usually called worlds, and R is called the accessibility relation. Thus wRu is referred to as "u is accessible to w". F = W, R is called the frame on which M is based. V , the valuation, assigns every propositional variable p a set of worlds V (p) ⊆ W , which are considered as the worlds where p is true. To make this notion precise, we define the relation M, w ϕ ("ϕ is satisfied in w"), where w ∈ W , by induction on the construction of the formula, where the atomic case is given by V , the logical connectives are defined in the obvious way, and for the modal operators we use:
• M, w ϕ iff for every u ∈ W such that wRu, M, u ϕ; • M, w ♦ϕ iff there exists u ∈ W such that wRu and M, u ϕ. We say that ϕ is valid in M, M ϕ, if M, w ϕ for every w ∈ W , and that that ϕ is valid on a frame F , F ϕ, if ϕ is valid in every model based on F .
So far, no assumptions on the accessibility relation were made. And in fact, there is a strong connection between properties of the relation and the valid formulas of the model. Let Λ be a modal theory, and C some class of frames. We say Λ is sound with respect to C if every ϕ ∈ Λ is valid in every frame in C. Λ is complete with respect to C if every formula valid in every frame of C is in Λ; equivalently, for every ϕ / ∈ Λ there is some model M = W, R, V where W, R ∈ C and some w ∈ W such that M, w ¬ϕ. Λ is characterized by C if it is sound and complete with respect to it.
A well known theorem is that the modal theory we are interested in, S4.2, is characterized by the class of finite frames W, R for which R is reflexive, transitive and directed (i.e. wRv ∧ wRu → ∃z(vRz ∧ uRz)). However, it will be convenient to find a class of more structured frames characterizing this theory. Definition 2.2. Let F, ≤ such that ≤ is a reflexive and transitive binary relation on F . We can define an equivalence relation on F by setting x ≡ y iff x ≤ y ≤ x. This equivalence relation induces a partial order on F/ ≡, which we will also denote by ≤. F, ≤ is called a pre-Boolean-algebra (a pBA) if F/ ≡, ≤ is a Boolean-algebra (a BA). Note that a pBA is in particular reflexive, transitive and directed.
A pBA can be thought of as a BA where every element is replaced by a cluster of equivalent elements. Theorem 2.3 (Theorem 11 in [6] ). S4.2 is characterized by the class of all finite preBoolean-algebras.
2.3.
The modal logic of forcing. We present the framework of the modal logic of forcing, based on [6] and [5] . The reader who is familiar with these works may wish to skip to definition 2.12 where we define the new notion of an n-switch.
As we mentioned in the introduction, the possible world semantics suggest a connection between modal logic and forcing, as we can imagine all generic extensions of the universe (or of a specific model of ZFC) as an enormous Kripke model (called "the generic multiverse"). This leads to the forcing interpretation of modal logic, in which we say that a sentence of set-theory ϕ is necessary ( ϕ) if it is true in all forcing extensions, and possible (♦ϕ) if it is true in some forcing extension. Note that these operators can be expressed in the language of set-theory by the definability of the forcing relation: ϕ is the statement "for every poset P and p ∈ P, p ϕ" and ♦ϕ is the statement "there is a poset P and p ∈ P such that p ϕ". Given some definable class of forcing notions Γ, we can also restrict to posets belonging to that class, to get the operators Γ , ♦ Γ . The following definitions, based on [6] and [5] , allow us to formally ask the question -what statements are valid under this interpretation? Definition 2.4.
(1) Given a formula ϕ = ϕ (q 0 ,..., q n ) in the language of modal logic, where q 0 ,..., q n are the only propositional variable appearing in ϕ, and some set-theoretic sentences ψ 0 ,..., ψ n , the substitution instance ϕ (ψ 0 ,..., ψ n ) is the set-theoretic statement obtained recursively by replacing q i with ψ i and interpreting the modal operators according to the forcing interpretation (or the Γ-forcing interpretation). (2) Let Γ be a class of forcing notions. The ZFC-provable principles of Γ-forcing are all the modal formulas ϕ such that ZFC ⊢ ϕ (ψ 0 ,..., ψ n ) for every substitution q i → ψ i under the Γ-forcing interpretation. This will also be called the modal logic of Γ-forcing, denoted MLF (Γ). If we discuss the class of all forcing notions we omit mention of Γ.
Theorem 2.5 (Hamkins and Löwe, [6] ). If ZFC is consistent then the ZFC-provable principles of forcing are exactly S4.2.
We will now present the main tools which were developed to prove the theorem above, and which can be used to prove similar theorems. To prove such a theorem, we need to establish lower and upper bounds, i.e. find a modal theory Λ such that MLF (Γ) ⊇ Λ and MLF (Γ) ⊆ Λ respectively. Each type of bound require a different set of tools, which will be presented below. Definition 2.6. A definable class of forcing notions Γ is said to be reflexive if it contains the trivial forcing; transitive if it is closed under finite iterations, i.e. if P ∈ Γ andQ is a P-name for a poset such that PQ ∈ Γ, then P * Q ∈ Γ; persistent if P, Q ∈ Γ implies Q ∈ Γ V P ; and directed if P, Q ∈ Γ implies that there is some R ∈ Γ such that R is forcing equivalent to P * Ṡ and to Q * Ṫ, whereṠ ∈ Γ
Note that if a Γ is transitive and persistent, we can show it is directed by taking R = P × Q for any P, Q ∈ Γ.
Example 2.7. The class of all forcing notions is reflexive, transitive and persistent (and thus directed). The class of all c.c.c forcing notions is reflexive and transitive, but not persistent, and in fact not directed.
Theorem 2.8 (Thm. 7 in [5] ). Axiom T is valid in every reflexive forcing class, axiom 4 in every transitive forcing class and axiom .2 in every directed forcing class. Thus, if Γ is reflexive, transitive and directed then MLF(Γ) ⊇ S4.2.
2.3.2.
Upper bounds. To establish that Λ is an upper bound for MLF (Γ), we need to show that every formula not in Λ is also not in MLF (Γ). To do so, we would need to find a model of ZFC and some substitution instance of ϕ that fails in this model. In the case that Λ is complete w.r.t some class of frames C, ϕ / ∈ Λ means that there is some Kripke model based on a frame in C where ϕ fails. So our goal would be to find a suitable model of set theory W such that the Γ-generic multiverse generated by W (i.e. all Γ-forcing extensions of W ) "looks like" the model where ϕ fails. The main tool for that is called a labeling:
Definition 2.9. A Γ-labeling of a frame F, R for a model of set-theory W is an assignment to each w ∈ F a set-theoretic statement Φ w such that:
(1) The statements form a mutually exclusive partition of truth in the Γ-generic multiverse over W , i.e. every Γ-generic extension of W satisfies exactly one Φ w . Lemma 2.10 (The labeling lemma -Lemma 9 in [5] ). Suppose w → Φ w is a Γ-labeling of a finite frame F, R for a model of set-theory W with w 0 an initial world of F , and M a Kripke model based on F . Then there is an assignment of the propositional variables p → ψ p such that for every modal formula ϕ (p 0 ,..., p n )
Corollary 2.11. If every finite pre-Boolean-algebra has a Γ-labeling over some model of
Proof. By theorem 2.3, every modal formula ϕ / ∈ S4.2 fails in a Kripke model based on some finite pBA. So, given a Γ-labeling for this frame over a model W , by the labeling lemma there is a substitution instance of ϕ which fails at W under the Γ-forcing interpretation. So ϕ / ∈ MLF (Γ).
Hence to establish upper bounds, we try to find labelings for specific frames. Various labelings can be constructed using certain kinds of set-theoretic statements, called in general control statements. with i as a parameter, where I is well-ordered, such that pushing r i pushes every r j for j < i, and necessarily, every unpushed r i can be pushed without pushing any r j for j > i. An infinite ratchet
A family of control statements (switches, n-switches, buttons, ratchets) is called independent over W (for Γ-forcing) if in W , all buttons are unpushed (including the ones in any ratchet), and necessarily, using Γ-forcing, each button can be pushed, each switch can be turned on or off, the value of each n-switch can be changed, and the value of every ratchet can be increased, without affecting any other control statement in the family. Note the "necessarily" -the independence needs to be preserved in any Γ-forcing extension of W .
n-switches are less naturally occurring in set-theory than the other notions, and indeed they were not explicitly defined in [6] and [5] . However, by examining the proofs of some of the main theorems there, one can see that what was implicitly used was an n-switch, which was constructed using switches (cf. [5, theorems 10,11,13] ). Additionally, in some cases switches were constructed from ratchets and then transformed into n-switches (e.g. in [5, theorems 12, 15] ). So, in the definition of some of the central labelings, n-switches turn out to be the more natural notion, and we will show how to construct them using either switches or a ratchet independently. Hence the following theorem, which gives sufficient conditions for the existence of labelings for finite pBA's, generalizes some of the above-mentioned theorems from [5] , and they can be inferred from it. We will not be able to use the theorem as it is to prove our main theorem, but we will use it's proof as a model, so it has instructive value in itself. Theorem 2.13. Let Γ be some reflexive and transitive forcing class and W a model of set theory. If there are arbitrarily large finite families of buttons, mutually independent of nswitches for large enough n's, then there is a Γ-labeling over W for every frame which is a finite pre-Boolean-algebra .
Proof. Let F, ≤ be a finite pBA. As noted earlier, it can be viewed a finite BA, where each element is replaced by a cluster of equivalent worlds. We can add dummy worlds to each cluster without changing satisfaction in the model, so we can assume that each cluster is of size n for some 1 < n < ω. It is known that any finite BA is isomorphic to the BA P (B) , ⊆ for some finite set B. Let B be such that F/ ≡, ≤ ∼ = P (B) , ⊆ , and set m = |B|. We can assume that in fact B = {0,..., m − 1}. There is a correspondence between subsets A ⊆ B and clusters in F, ≤ . Each cluster is of size n, so by enumerating each cluster, all the elements of F can be named w A i for i < n and A ⊆ B, where w
′ . An initial world in F must be in the bottom cluster, which corresponds to ∅ ⊆ B so WLoG it is enumerated as w ∅ 0 . By the assumption, adding more dummy worlds to each cluster if needed, there are buttons {b 0 ,..., b m−1 } and an n-switch {s 0 ,..., s n−1 } all independent of each other over W . We can assume the buttons are pure. To define a labeling, each cluster, corresponding to some A ⊆ B, will be labeled by the statement that the only buttons pushed are the ones with indexes from A. Inside each cluster, each world will be labeled by the corresponding value of the n-switch. Formally, we set
and claim that this is a labeling as required by verifying the conditions:
(
, and that for any other pair (A
. So these statements indeed form a mutually exclusive partition of truth in the Γ-generic multiverse over W .
By the assumption of independence of the control statements, we can, by Γ-forcing, push all the buttons in A ′ A (and only them) and change the n-switch
Note that by the transitivity of Γ, the b i 's are still independent pure buttons in
. By the definition of pure buttons and the reflexivity of Γ,
A part of the definition of independence is that no button is pushed in W (since they are pure and Γ reflexive, it is equivalent to saying none is true). We can assume WLoG that W s 0 . So W Φ w ∅ 0 . Corollary 2.14. Under the assumptions of theorem 2.13, MLF (Γ) ⊆ S4.2.
Proof. Apply corollary 2.11.
Lemma 2.15. An n-switch can be produced using the following control statements:
(1) Independent switches s 0 ,..., s m−1 if n = 2 m ; (2) A strong ratchet {r i | i ∈ I} where I is either a limit ordinal or Ord, the class of all ordinals, and i ∈ I is a parameter in r i .
Proof. For (1), if j < 2 m lets j be the statement that the pattern of switches corresponds to the binary digits of j, that is, {s i | the i-th binary digit of j is 1} ∧ {¬s i | the i-th binary digit of j is 0} .
Clearly in any extension exactly one pattern of the switches holds, so exactly ones j holds. By the independence of the switches, any pattern can be forced over any extension.
For (2), every i ∈ I is an ordinal, so of the form ω · α + k for some α ∈ Ord and k < ω. Then we lets j be the statement "if i = ω · α + k is the first such that ¬r i then k mod n = j". Since no extension satisfies all the r i 's, there is always some i which is the first such that ¬r i , and therefore there is some unique j such thats j holds. Since it is a ratchet, in every extension, for every j ′ < n, we can increase its value to some
we use the assumption that if I is an ordinal then it is a limit).
Note also that every family of independent buttons b i | i ∈ I where I is as above, with no extensions where all of them are pushed, can be transformed into a strong ratchet by setting r i = ∀j < i b j ∧ ¬b i . To conclude, we get the following: ). Let Γ be some reflexive and transitive forcing class and W a model of set theory. If there are arbitrarily large finite families of buttons mutually independent with arbitrarily large finite families of switches, with a strong ratchet as above or with another family of independent buttons as above, then there is a Γ-labeling for every frame which is a finite pre-Boolean-algebra over W . So in such cases, MLF (Γ) ⊆ S4.2.
σ
We now proceed to the investigation of the modal logic of a specific class of forcing notions -the class of all σ-centered forcing notions.
Definition 3.1. Let P be any poset.
(1) A subset C ⊆ P is called centered if any finite number of elements in C have a common extension in P. (2) A poset is called σ-centered if it is the union of countably many centered subsets.
Remark 3.2. For convenience we will always assume that the top element ½ P is in each of the centered posets. This does not affect the generality since every element is compatible with it. It will also sometimes be convenient to assume that if P = n∈ω P n where each P n is centered, then each P n is upward closed, i.e. if q ∈ P n and q ≤ p then p ∈ P n . This also doesn't affect the generality since if q 1 ,..., q k ∈ P n and q i ≤ p i then a common extension for the q i 's will also extend the p i 's .
The following is a central example for a σ-centered forcing, versions of which will be used later on: Definition 3.3. Let Y be a subset of P (ω). We define a poset P Y as follows:
• The elements are of the form s, t where s is a finite subset of ω and t a finite subset of Y ;
So we think of the first component as finite approximations for a generic real x ⊆ ω, while the second component limits our options in extending the approximation. A condition p = s, t tells us that s ⊆ x and that for every A ∈ t, x ∩ A = s ∩ A, so that the intersection of x with any set in Y will turn out to be finite.
Proof. Note that if t 1 ,..., t n are finite subsets of Y , then for any s ∈ [ω] <ω , the conditions s, t 1 ,..., s, t n are all extended by s, t 1 ∪ · · · ∪ t n . So P is the union of the centered posets P s = { s, t | t ⊆ Y finite}. Since there are only countably many finite subsets of ω, we get that P is σ-centered.
We will explore the properties of this kind of posets in section 3.2.
3.1. Properties of σ-centered forcing. We proceed with a few general properties of forcing with σ-centered posets. Most of them are folklore, but we provide the proofs for the benefit of the reader. An immediate observation is that every σ-centered poset also has the c.c.c, since any uncountable set will have an uncountable intersection with one of the centered posets, and therefore cannot be an antichain. So forcing with a σ-centered posets preserves all cardinals and cofinalities.
But σ-centered forcing notions have the stronger property that they also preserve the continuum function:
Proof. Assume P = n<ω P n where each P n is centered. Let f ∈ V P be some function from λ to 2 , letḟ be a name denoting f and q ∈ P s.t. q ḟ :λ →2. In V , define
To see this, say f (α) = 0 and g (α) = 1, and let p force both these facts. So, if p ∈ P n , we clearly get that (α, n, 0) ∈ A f . But also (α, n, 0) / ∈ A g , since that would imply there is some p ′ ∈ P n such that p ′ ġ (α) = 0, but p is compatible with p ′ and p ġ (α) = 1 by contradiction. Hence 2 λ in V P is bounded by the possible number of sets of the form A f in V , which is bounded by
Since every subset of λ in V is also one in V P , we get equality.
Another important property of σ-centered forcing is it's productivity. Unlike c.c.c posets which are not necessarily productive, σ-centered posets are productive in a rather strong manner: Lemma 3.6. Let P α | α < λ for some λ < 2 ℵ0 + be a collection of σ-centered posets. Let P = α<λ P α be the finite support product of P α | α < λ . Then P is also σ-centered. To prove this we would need the following lemma (theorem 3 in [3] ): 2 The proof of this lemma is an elaboration of an answer on Math Stack Exchange at http://math. stackexchange.com/q/1766520 3 The proof of this lemma was extracted from the answers of Andreas Blass and Stefan Geschke on Math Overflow at http://mathoverflow.net/q/84124 Lemma 3.7. If λ < 2 ℵ0 + then there is a function F : λ × ω → ω such that for every α 1 ,..., α l < λ, a 1 ,..., a l < ω there is some n < ω such that F (α i , n) = a i for all i = 1,..., l.
Proof of lemma 3.6. For each α < λ let P α = n<ω P n α . Let F : λ × ω → ω be a function as in lemma 3.7, and set
First we claim that P = n<ω Q n . Let p ∈ P, and assume α 1 ,..., α l < λ are the only ones where
for every i = 1,..., l, and for every other α we have p (α) = ½ Pα ∈ P F (α,n) α (by the assumption in remark 3.2), so p ∈ Q n . Second we claim that each Q n is centered. Let p 1 ,..., p l ∈ Q n . For every α < λ, if there is some i such that p i (α) = ½ Pα , we define q (α) to be some common extension
is centered. Otherwise we take q (α) = ½ Pα . Only finitely many α's will give us q (α) = ½ Pα , so indeed q ∈ P, and it is clear that it is a common extension of p 1 ,..., p l .
The two-step iteration of σ-centered posets is also σ-centered: 4 Lemma 3.8. If P is a σ-centered posets andQ is a P-name such that P forces thatQ is a σ-centered posets, then also P * Q is σ-centered.
Proof. Let P = n<ω P n such that each P n is centered. By remark 3.2 we assume that each P n is upward closed. By the assumption, there are P-namesQ n such that ½ P forces thatQ = n<ωQ n and eachQ n is centered. Let A n,m = p, τ ∈ P * Q | ∃q ∈ P n q ≤ p ∧ q τ ∈Q m .
• P * Q = n,m<ω A n,m : If p, τ ∈ P * Q, since p Q = n<ωQ n and by the definition of the iteration p τ ∈Q, there is some q ≤ p s.t. q τ ∈Q m for some m < ω. In addition there is some n s.t. q ∈ P n , therefore p, τ ∈ A n,m .
• Each A n,m is centered: Let p i , τ i ∈ A n,m for i = 1,..., k and let q i τ i ∈Q m .
Since P n is centered we can take a common extension q ∈ P of the q i 's. So q τ i ∈Q m for each i and also q forces thatQ m is centered, so it forces that there a common extension for them. So there is some name τ such that q forces that τ is a common extension of all the τ i 's inQ. In particular q τ ∈Q so q, τ ∈ P * Q and by definition it extends each p i , τ i .
So indeed P * Q is a countable union of centered posets as required.
Note that this shows that Γ σ−centered , the class of all σ-centered forcing notions, is transitive. It is also reflexive since the trivial forcing is trivially σ-centered, and persistent since being the union of countably many centered subsets is an upward absolute notion. So, using theorem 2.8, we have the following: Theorem 3.9. The ZFC-provable principles of σ-centered forcing contain S4.2.
Finally, it will be of use to know that essentially, σ-centered forcing notions are "small", so there aren't too many of them: Lemma 3.10. Let P be a σ-centered forcing notion. Then the separative quotient of P is of size at most 2 ℵ0 .
Proof. Let P = n∈ω P n . Again we assume that each P n is upward closed. Recall that the separative quotient is the quotient of P by the equivalence relation: x, y ∈ P, x ∼ y iff {z ∈ P | z x} = {z ∈ P | z y}. We denote the equivalence class of x by [x]. Define for every x ∈ P A (x) = {n ∈ ω | x ∈ P n } .
We claim that for every x, y ∈ P,
means that (WLoG) there is some z x such that z⊥y. Let z ′ be a common extension of z and x. So z ′ ⊥y as well (otherwise z would be compatible with y). Let n ∈ ω such that z ′ ∈ P n . Since we assumed P n is upward closed, also x ∈ P n , so n ∈ A (x). Assume towards contradiction that n ∈ A (y), i.e. y ∈ P n . But P n is centered, so y and z ′ must be compatible, which is a contradiction.
So we get that |P/ ∼| ≤ |{A (x) | x ∈ P}| ≤ |P (ω)| = 2 ℵ0 .
Corollary 3.11. Up to forcing-equivalence, there are at most 2 3.2. Almost disjoint forcing. In this section we present one of the tools for labeling frames with σ-centered forcing -almost disjoint forcing, which is a version of the example introduced in the previous section. The results in this section are due to Jensen and Solovay in [9] . Two infinite sets are called almost disjoint (a.d.) if their intersection is finite. We would like to have a way to construct almost disjoint subsets of ω in a very definable and absolute way. For that, we fix some recursive enumeration {s i | i < ω} of all finite sequences of ω, and define for every f : ω → ω
If f, g are distinct then S (f ) and S (g) are almost disjoint. Hence, {S (f ) | f : ω → ω} is a family of 2 ℵ0 pairwise a.d. subsets of ω. Recall that for every Y ⊆ P (ω), P Y is the forcing notion consisting of pairs s, t where s is a finite subset of ω and t a finite subset of Y , and s
From the discussion at section 2.4 of [9] we obtain the following: Theorem 3.12. Let F ∈ M be a family of a.d. subsets of ω, and Y ⊆ F (in M ). Then forcing with P Y adds a real x such that for every y ∈ F , x ∩ y is finite iff y ∈ Y .
So P Y adds a generic real x which is almost-disjoint from each member of Y . Furthermore, if x is obtained by the generic filter G, then clearly
. This gives us a method to code subsets of 2 ω using subsets of ω. Let M be some model of ZFC, set as before a recursive enumeration {s i } of ω <ω and an enumeration {f α | α < κ} ∈ M of ω ω (where κ = (2 ω ) M ), and define F = {S (f α ) | α < κ}. So for each A ⊆ κ, A ∈ M , we can define Y = Y (A) = {S (f α ) | α ∈ A}, and force with P Y to obtain a generic real x = x A . So by the previous theorem,
(note that P Y preserves both cardinals and the continuum, so κ = (2 ω ) M [x] , and if
). In this case, we say that "x codes A".
L σ
Our goal in this section will be to prove that the modal logic of σ-centered forcing is contained in S4.2. Recall that our method for that is labeling finite pre-Boolean-algebras (theorem 2.11). In theorem 2.13 we have shown that a labeling can be produced by finding arbitrarily large families of independent buttons, which are independent of an n-switch for some large enough n. Our proof here will be modeled on that proof, although we will not actually find such families. We begin by describing a specific model W which will be our ground model, then construct an independent family of buttons and two different n-switches. Like in the proof of theorem 2.13, given some finite pBA, we will use the buttons to label the position in the quotient BA, and the n-switches to label the position within each cluster. The difference will be that we use one n-switch t label clusters below the top cluster of the BA, and the other for the top cluster. The need for this modification will be explained in due time.
4.1. The ground model. We begin with the constructible universe L, and use Cohen forcing to obtain mutually generic reals
Our ground model W is a generic extension of Z, which preserves the mutual genericity of a α,i | α < ω L 1 , i < ω , such that these reals are ordinal-definable with a definition which is absolute for generic extensions of W by σ-centered forcing. This can be done e.g. by using Easton forcing to code the reals in the power function above some large enough cardinal. Any extension of W for which the above definition is absolute will be called an appropriate extension. We will also require that in W we do not collapse cardinals and add no new subsets below ℵ ω , so e.g. ω
. From now on we'll deal with forcings which do not collapse cardinals (by c.c.c), and also do not change the continuum (by lemma 3.5), so we omit such superscripts.
4.2. The buttons. Now over W we can define T i , for i < ω, as the statement:
For every real x and for all but boundedly many
Since the reals a α,i and the sequences a β,j | β < ω 1 , j = i are ordinal definable in W and it's appropriate extensions, also L [x, a β,j | β < ω 1 , j = i ] is definable with x as a parameter. So, formally, T i includes the definitions of these elements, which will be interpreted as we expect in all relevant models. The question whether a real r is generic over some definable submodel is also expressible in the language of set theory, as it just means that r is in every open dense subset of ω ω which is in that model. So T i is indeed a sentence in the language of set theory. Note that if we want, by slight abuse of notation we can treat i as a "variable" denoting a natural number, rather than a definable term; thus we would be able to phrase sentences such as ∀i < ω T i . This will be used in the next section. In this section when we talk about a specific T i , we take i to be a fixed term. (1) W T i for every i: We required that we do not add any new subsets of ω ω or any new real. So every real x ∈ W is already in Z. Fix some i < ω and a real x ∈ W . This real was introduced by at most boundedly many a α,i , that is, there is some γ < ω 1 such that
All the reals a α,i for α > γ are generic over the above model so also above
(2) ¬T i is a pure button for appropriate extensions: if for some a α,i there is some real x such that a α,i is not generic over L [x, a β,j | β < ω 1 , j = i ], then it will never again be generic over this model. So, if we destroy T i , we can never get it back as long as it keeps it's above meaning. Note that if an extension is not appropriate, then T i might have a completely different meaning than what is intended, as the definitions we use will give some different sets, so it is paramount we stick with appropriate extensions.
We will now define forcing notions which will allow us to destroy T i , by destroying the genericity of the relevant a α,i 's. Definition 4.2. In W , we define P i to be the forcing notion with conditions of the form {U s1 ,..., U sn , a α1,i ,..., a α l ,i } where n, l < ω and U s k ⊆ ω ω are basic open (see definition 2.1), and for conditions p, q ∈ P i , q ≤ p iff p ⊆ q and whenever a α,i ∈ p and U s ∈ q p, a α,i / ∈ U s . That is, to extend a condition, we can add any finite number of the reals, and we can add any finite number of basic open sets, as long as the new sets do not include any of the old reals.
We will show that the forcing P i destroys the genericity of all the a α,i 's, by adding dense open sets (approximated by the U s 's) that do not include them. So, intuitively, a condition p = {U s1 ,..., U sn , a α1,i ,..., a α l ,i } states which reals will be avoided in subsequent stages.
Remark 4.3. Given some distinct a α1,i ,..., a α l ,i , we can always find some s such that a α1,i ,..., a α l ,i / ∈ U s : let t = l k=1 a α k ,i , i.e. the longest initial segment common to a α1,i ,..., a α l ,i . Assume t is of length n, and take some j ∈ ω {a α1,i (n) ,..., a α l ,i (n)}.
Let G ⊆ P i be a generic filter. Note that by the former remark, the set of conditions having at least n basic-open sets in them is dense in P i (given a condition p, we can find an s such that U s does not contain any of the reals in p, and then add to p, e.g., U s , U s ⌢ 0 , U s ⌢ 0,0 ... to obtain an extension with at least n basic-open sets). So, the conditions in G give us an infinite sequence U sn | n < ω of basic-open sets. So there is some p ∈ G ∩ D s,N , and some U s ′ ∈ p witnessing that. p ∈ G so U s ′ ∈ U sn | n < ω , and since ℓ (s ′ ) > N , by the definition of N s ′ = s n for some n ≥ k, so U s ′ appears in n≥k U sn . Hence s is extended by some member of n≥k U sn . This was for any s, so n≥k U sn is indeed dense.
Lemma 4.5. For every α < ω 1 there is some k such that a α,i / ∈ n≥k U sn .
Proof. Fix α < ω 1 and let D α = {p ∈ P i | a α,i ∈ p}. So D α is clearly open, and it is dense since for every p, p ∪ {a α,i } is a legitimate extension of p (we did not limit the addition of a β,i 's). So there is some p ∈ G ∩ D α . Let k be larger than any n such that U sn ∈ p. We want to show that a α,i / ∈ n≥k U sn . Otherwise, there is some n ≥ k such that a α,i ∈ U sn . So there is some q ∈ G with U sn ∈ q, and by moving to a common extension (since G is a filter) we can assume q ≤ p. In fact, q < p, since U sn / ∈ p by the choice of k and n. But a α,i ∈ p, q < p and U sn ∈ q p imply that a α,i / ∈ U sn , by contradiction.
So indeed, P i adds open-dense sets which destroy the genericity of every a α,i . This will show that T i is destroyed, once we show that T i still means the same thing after forcing with P i . Lemma 4.6. P i is σ-centered.
Proof. For every t 1 ,..., t n ∈ ω <ω , let P (t 1 ,..., t n ) be the set of all conditions in P i containing exactly the basic-open sets U t1 ,..., U tn . Note that there are only ω such sets {t 1 ,..., t n }, and that clearly P i = t1,...,tn∈ω <ω P (t 1 ,..., t n ). Now notice that every P (t 1 ,..., t n ) is centered, since if p 1 ,..., p l ∈ P (t 1 ,..., t n ), then p 1 ∪ · · · ∪ p l is still a legitimate condition in P i , and it extends each p j since the only limitation on extension concerned the basic-open sets, which we did not change.
Corollary 4.7. Let W ′ be some appropriate extension of W . Let G ⊆ P i be generic over
Proof. Note that by σ-centeredness, after forcing with P i the meaning of all the definitions in T i remain the same. So we will find a real x ∈ W ′ [G] such that all the a α,i 's are already not generic over L [x], so surely T i fails. Let t i | i < ω ∈ L be some definable enumeration of ω <ω . Define x = {m | ∃p ∈ G (U tm ∈ p)}. So, if as before U sn | n < ω is the sequence of basic-open sets given by G, then it is equivalent to U tm | m ∈ x by some rearranging of the order. So in L [x] we can already define each union n≥k U sn . Hence, as we have shown above, each a α,i is not in some dense-open set of ω ω in L [x], and therefore not generic over L [x] as required.
Our next task will be to show that forcing with some P j does not affect the truth of T i for any i = j.
Proof. Assume otherwise. Then there is some
′ be a P j -name for x. Since x is a real, we can assume thatẋ is a name containing only elements of the form q,ň for n ∈ ω and q ∈ P j . Furthermore, since P j is c.c.c, we can assume that there are only countably many elements of the form q,ň for each n. Soẋ is a countable collection of elements of the form q,ň . We wish to "code"ẋ by some real y ∈ W ′ . We do this in the usual way:
• Let γ be the supremum of all α < ω 1 such that a α,j ∈ q for some q,ň ∈ẋ.
Sinceẋ is countable and each such q contains only finitely many a α,j 's, γ < ω 1 .
• Each q ∈ P j is of the form {U s1 ,..., U sn , a α1,j ,..., a α l ,j }, so it is determined by a finite subset of ω <ω and a finite subset of ordinals no larger than γ. This information can be coded by a finite sequence of natural numbers z q (e.g. a sequence s is coded by 3
where p m is the m-th prime number, and fixing some bijection f : γ → ω we code a α,j using 2 f (α)+1 ).
• Each pair z q ,ň can be coded by a natural number (e.g. if ℓ (z q ) = m then by
• So the entireẋ can be coded by a set of natural numbers y. All these codings are done in
′ , and since the definition of P j requires only the reals a β,j | β < ω 1 , P j ∈ M . In addition, since we can decode y in this model, we haveẋ ∈ M . Since P j ∈ M ⊆ W ′ , G is generic also over M . The fact that a α,i is not generic over
. So there is some p ∈ G and some To conclude, packing up what we have done in this section, we obtain the following:
Theorem 4.9. {¬T i | i < ω} is a family of independent buttons over W for σ-centered forcing.
Remark 4.10. In fact, we can replace "σ-centered" with any every reflexive and transitive class of forcing notions, containing all the P i 's, such that every extension of W with a forcing from the class yields an appropriate extension.
Note that if it were the case that in no extension of W by σ-centered forcing all these buttons are pushed, we could have finished the proof of our main theorem using corollary 2.16. However, by lemma 3.6, i<ω P i is σ-centered, and it pushes all the buttons. Therefore we need something more to complete the proof.
4.3.
The n-switches. In this section we would like to define an n-switch which is independent of any finite number of the buttons from the previous section, using a construction similar to clause 2. of lemma 2.15. We begin with a construction which gives us statements which are almost an n-switch, as they function only for specific extensions of W . Then we build a second n-switch that will function for all other extensions, but will not be independent of the buttons. In the next section we will show how to use both constructions for our purpose.
Given an enumeration of some infinite number of the statements from the previous section, T i | 0 < i < ω (we can rename the statements as we want, and later we will use this fact), define R j (where j < ω) as the statement j = sup ({0 < i < ω | ¬T i } ∪ {0}) (recall that we can use i as a "variable" in T i ). So R 0 holds iff no button is pushed, and if in some appropriate extension of W we have R j for j > 0, then in particular we have ¬T j ∧ T l for any l > j, and we can force with P l to obtain exactly R l . Additionally, if some R j holds, it means in particular that the number of pushed buttons is bounded. Now, to define an n-switch, given some n > 1, we set Θ j = ∃k < ω (R k ∧ k mod n = j) for any j < n. So in any appropriate extension of W ′ , if Θ j holds for some j, this means in particular that there is some k such that R k holds, so for every j ′ < n we can find k ′ > k with k ′ mod n = j ′ and then force with P k ′ to obtain R k ′ and thus Θ j ′ . It is also clear that no two distinct Θ j 's can hold at the same time, and that if the above supremum is finite, then some Θ j hold. So, {Θ j | j < n} functions as an n-switch, but only as long as the number of pushed buttons is bounded. If in some appropriate extension there are unboundedly many buttons pushed (which is possible as we noted above), no R k holds, so also no Θ j hold. So this is "almost" an n-switch.
We now define a "real" n-switch, which we will use in extensions where the number of pushed buttons may be unbounded. The reason we don't use only the following nswitch is that it may not be independent from the buttons. Proposition 4.11. Let W be the model constructed in the previous section. Then for every n > 1 there is an n-switch for σ-centered forcing over W .
and that in our construction of W we required that all subsets of ω and of ω 1 in W are already in Z (and in particular W 2 ℵ0 = ℵ 1 and W 2 ℵ1 = ℵ 2 ). Also note that using the coding of a α,i | α < ω 1 , i < ω , in all appropriate extensions of W , sets in Z are definable from ordinals using sentences of set-theory. So let f α | α < ω 1 ∈ Z be a definable enumeration of all the functions f : ω → ω in Z (equivalently, in W ), and define y α = S (f α ) as in section 3.2. Let A ξ | ξ < ω 2 ∈ Z be some fixed definable enumeration of all the subsets (in Z, or, equivalently, in W ) of ω 1 . Let C (x, ξ) be the statement "x ⊆ ω and α ∈ A ξ ↔ x∩y α is finite", referred to as "x is a real coding A ξ ". By the discussion at the end of section 3.2, for every ξ there is a σ-centered forcing notion Q ξ ∈ Z such that Q ξ ∃xC (x, ξ). We would like to define a ratchet by letting r (α) be the statement α = sup {ξ < ω 2 | ∃xC (x, ξ)}, and use it to construct an n-switch as in lemma 2.15. By defining so, we can indeed always increase the value of the r (α) by forcing with Q α . The problem is that in a certain extension, forcing with Q α might also add a real coding A ξ some ξ > α. To fix that, we will define an unbounded set E such that adding a code for A α for some α ∈ E doesn't add a code for any larger A ξ .
We work now within W , and fix some σ-centered poset Q ∈ W . Let α < ω 2 . We define by induction {α ζ | ζ < ω 1 }. Set α 0 = α. If α ζ < ω 2 is defined for ζ < ω 1 , let
The above set is not empty since Q α ζ ∃xC (x,α ζ ). In particular, α ζ < α ζ+1 .
Claim 4.12. α ζ+1 < ω 2 .
Proof. We show that for any σ-centered forcing P ∈ W , there is some β P < ω 2 such that P " sup {β | ∃xC (x, β)} ≤ β P ", i.e. P ∃xC x,β →β ≤β P . First of all, since any σ-centered forcing preserves cardinals and also the continuum function,
ℵ0 . In particular, P " sup {β | ∃xC (x, β)} < ω 2 ", since there cannot be ℵ 2 reals each coding a different subset of ω 1 . Note that there can only be ℵ 0 many possible values for sup {β | ∃xC (x, β)}: otherwise there would be uncountably many conditions forcing different values for sup {β | ∃xC (x, β)}, therefore an uncountable antichain, contradicting the c.c.c of P . Hence, since ω 2 is regular, there is some β P bounding all these possible values, so it is indeed forced by P that sup {β | ∃xC (x, β)} ≤ β P . Now, taking P = Q × ξ≤α ζ Q ξ (since α ζ < ω 2 = 2 ℵ0 + , this is σ-centered by lemma 3.6), if for some γ, P ¬∃xC (x,γ), then there is p ∈ P such that p ∃xC (x,γ), but also p " sup {β | ∃xC (x, β)} ≤ β P " so p γ ≤β P <ω 2 . Since the ordinals don't change, we indeed get γ ≤ β P . So by the definition, α ζ+1 ≤ β P + 1 < ω 2 . For ζ < ω 1 limit, set α ζ = sup {α ξ | ξ < ζ} (ω 2 is regular so also in this case α ζ < ω 2 ), and finally let α * = sup {α ζ | ζ < ω 1 }. Again since ω 2 is regular, α * < ω 2 .
Claim 4.13. Let G be generic for
So there is a Q-name τ and some p * ∈ G which forces C τ,β . For every n, let C n ⊆ Q be a maximal antichain below p * of conditions deciding the statementň ∈ τ . By the c.c.c each C n is countable, so also C = n∈ω C n is countable. Every element of Q is of the form q, (p γ ) γ<α * where only for finitely many γ's p γ = ½ Qγ . So for each p ∈ A, denote this finite set of ordinals by F p , and let γ * = sup p∈A F p . Each F p is a set of ordinals less than α * , so γ * ≤ α * . But since C is countable and each F p is finite, γ * has at most countable cofinality, while α * is the limit of an increasing ω 1 sequence α ζ | ζ < ω 1 , so γ * < α * , and furthermore, there is some ζ < ω 1 such that γ * ≤ α ζ . LetQ = Q × ξ≤α ζ Q ξ . For every p ∈ Q, if p = q, (p γ ) γ<α * , letp = q, (p γ ) γ≤α ζ , and letḠ = {p | p ∈ G}.Ḡ isQ-generic over W . We claim that x ∈ W Ḡ and W Ḡ C (x, β). Define theQ-namē
Remark. By the choice of α ζ ≥ γ * , for every p ∈ C n , if it is of the form q, (p γ ) γ<α * , then p γ = ½ for every γ > α ζ .
If n ∈ x then there is some p ∈ G, p ≤ p * that forcesň ∈ τ . By the maximality of C n , it intersects G, which is a filter, so a condition in the intersection must also forceň ∈ τ (and notň / ∈ τ ). So we can choose such p ∈ C n ∩ G, and by definition p,ň ∈σ. In addition,p ∈Ḡ, so n ∈σḠ.
If n ∈σḠ there is some p ∈ C n , p ň ∈ τ such thatp ∈Ḡ. So, there is some r ∈ G such thatr =p. Note that by the remark r and p are equal in every coordinate where p is not trivial, so r ≤ p. Therefore also r ň ∈ τ , and r ∈ G so n ∈ x.
So, we get thatσḠ
A β = {α | x ∩ y α is finite} , so we can already have this equation in W Ḡ (since the y α 's don't change), so W Ḡ C (x, β). Therefore, we have that Q × ξ≤α ζ Q ξ ¬∃xC (x, β), so by the definition of
So we have defined an operation α → α * for every α < ω 2 (note that this operation was relative to Q). Since ∀α < ω 2 we have α < α * < ω 2 , the set {α * | α < ω 2 } is unbounded in ω 2 , so the set C Q consisting of all limit points of this set is a club.
By corollary 3.11, in W there are at most (2 
where Q is the trivial forcing are non-equivalent σ-centered posets, so we get exactly ℵ 2 posets. Since every separative σ-centered poset has size at most ℵ 1 , each can be coded as binary relations on ω 1 , so we can assume all such forcings in W are already in Z. Let Q ζ | ζ < ω 2 ∈ Z be some definable enumeration of all the separative σ-centered forcing notions in W , and define C as be the diagonal intersection of C Q ζ | ζ < ω 2 :
C is also a club in ω 2 (cf. lemma 8.4 in [8] ). Now we let
E is unbounded: it is known that the set {α < ω 2 | cf (α) = ω 1 } is stationary in ω 2 (cf. pg. 94 in [8] ), so it intersects the club {α ∈ C | α > γ} for each γ < ω 2 . Let e α | α < ω 2 ∈ Z be a (definable) ascending enumeration of E.
Remark. We would have preferred to work with C rather than E. The problem is that the * operation may not be continuous at limits of countable cofinality -to prove continuity, we would like to imitate the proof of claim 4.13, but it requires that the limit is of uncountable cofinality. If the length of the product is of countable cofinality, there might be a real that is not introduced in any bounded product. Now we can define r (α) as the statement "α = min {β < ω 2 | ¬∃xC (x, e β )}". These are indeed statements, since the e β 's are definable over Z = L [ a α,i | α < ω 1 , i < ω ], which is definable in W using the decoding of the generic reals. Again note that this definition retains it's intended meaning in every appropriate extension of W . Now given n > 1, define Φ j (for j < n) as the statement "r (ω · α + k) → (k mod n = j)". We claim that {Φ j | j < n} is an n-switch for σ-centered forcing over W .
Let Q ∈ W be some σ-centered poset, and G ⊆ Q generic over W . By lemma 3.5 W [G] satisfies 2 ℵ0 = ℵ 1 , so in particular the set {β < ω 2 | ∃xC (x, e β )} W [G] is bounded, since there are only ω 1 reals, and therefore there cannot be unboundedly many subsets of ω 1 coded by them. So there is some unique γ < ω 2 such that W [G] r (γ). There are some unique j, k < n such that γ = ω · α + k and k mod n = j, so W [G] Φ j . Hence every σ-centered extension of W satisfies exactly one Φ j . Now we need to show that for every j ′ = j there is some σ-centered extension of W [G] satisfying Φ j ′ . Recall the club C Q from the above construction. Q = Q ξ for some ξ < ω 2 . By the unboundedness of E, we can find some γ ′ such that e γ ′ > ξ and γ ′ = ω · α + j ′ for some α. We want to show that we have a generic extension of
∃xC (x, β).
Recall that e γ ′ is in the diagonal intersection of the clubs C Q ζ , so by definition, and since e γ ′ > ξ, e γ ′ ∈ ζ<e γ ′ C Q ζ ⊆ C Q ξ . So, by the definition of C Q ξ , e γ ′ is either of the form δ * for some δ and the * operation corresponding to Q ξ , or a limit point of such points. In the first case, we can just apply claim 4.13. In the second case, since e γ ′ ∈ E is of uncountable cofinality, we can repeat the proof of claim 4.13 with a sequence δ * ζ | ζ < ω 1 that witnesses e γ ′ ∈ C Q ξ , and get that the statement in claim 4.13 is true as well. That is, in both cases, we get that if
Since the enumeration of E is increasing, we get that
The forcing notions used in this n-switch add real numbers in a rather uncontrollable way, so it is indeed likely that they might add some real which destroys the genericity of the a α,i 's, therefore it is unlikely that this n-switch is independent of the buttons ¬T i . However, by using both constructions presented in this section, we can overcome the drawbacks each of them has.
The labeling.
Theorem 4.14. There is a σ-centered labeling for every finite pre-Boolean-algebra.
Proof. Let F, ≤ be a pBA. WLoG, by adding dummy worlds, we can assume each cluster in F contains n elements for some 1 < n < ω
5
. Let B be a finite set such that F/ ≡, ≤ is isomorphic to P (B) , ⊆ . So every world in F is of the form w C j for some j < n and C ⊆ B, and we have w
Let W be the model constructed in section 4.1. We can assume B ∈ W . Consider the predicates T i constructed in section 4.2, and rename them by choosing some T b for every b ∈ B, and renaming the rest as T i | 0 < i < ω . We will refer to these as the T -predicates. For each b ∈ B and 0 < i < ω let P b and P i be the corresponding forcing notions destroying T b and T i respectively. Let {Θ j | j < n} be statements constructed as in the beginning of section 4.3 from T i | 0 < i < ω , and {Φ j | j < n} be the n-switch constructed in proposition 4.11.
5 If every cluster has only one element then this proof is a bit redundant, as we don't need the n-switches, and we can label the BA only with the buttons from section 4.2.
For every C ⊆ B, define
which states that the pushed buttons out of {¬T b | b ∈ B} are exactly the ones labeled by elements in C.
Now for every C B and j < n we set Φ w
So, each cluster is labeled using the independent buttons {¬T b | b ∈ B}, and to move within each cluster below the topmost one we use the "almost" n-switch {Θ j | j < n}.
If we can no longer use it, that is, if there are unboundedly many T i 's destroyed, we put ourselves in the top cluster, and there we move using the n-switch {Φ j | j < n}. In this way, the fact that this n-switch is not independent of the buttons will not affect us, as we will always stay in the top cluster anyway. We will now show that this is indeed a labeling as required.
The statements are mutually exclusive: It is clear that the statements {Ψ C | C ⊆ B} are mutually exclusive, so Φ w The statements correspond to the relation: Assume we are in U which is a σ-centered forcing extension of W where Φ w C j is true. Assume first that C = B.
• Assume ♦Φ w
But U b∈C ¬T b , which are buttons, so they remain pushed in
• Assume w
so for every b ∈ C ′ C, we can force ¬T b , to obtain an extension U ′ satisfying Ψ C ′ (the buttons from C will remain pushed). In U , which satisfies Θ j , there is some k such that k mod n = j and U R k . In U ′ we still have R k , since pushing buttons of the form ¬T b does not push any button ¬T i . If j ′ = j we are done, otherwise we can find some k ′ > k, such that k ′ mod n = j ′ , push ¬T k ′ and thus obtain an extension U ′′ satisfying Θ j ′ . Again this forcing does not affect
. We distinguish the two cases.
• First, we assume
, so as we have seen before, we can force over U to obtain a generic extension satisfying Θ j ′ . This extension will still satisfy Ψ B since these are buttons, so it will satisfy Φ w B j ′ as required.
• Second assume U (sup {n | ¬T n } = ω) ∧ Φ j .
sup {n | ¬T n } = ω, any extension of it also satisfies sup {n | ¬T n } = ω since these are buttons, so we cannot have
, so as we have seen before, we can force over U to obtain a generic extension satisfying Φ j ′ . This extension will still satisfy sup {n | ¬T n } = ω since these are buttons, so it will satisfy Φ w B j ′ as required. Hence we have defined a σ-centered labeling for the frame F, ≤ over W . Proof. If ZFC is consistent then we can obtain the model W and the labelings described above. So by theorem 2.11 the ZFC-provable principles of σ-centered forcing are contained in S4.2, and by theorem 3.9 we get equality.
G
Throughout this work, we have focused on σ-centered forcing notions. However, by examining the proofs, one can see that we have not used the full strength of σ-centeredness. To obtain the lower bound, we used the reflexivity, transitivity and persistence of σ-centered posets. And to obtain the upper bound, we defined labelings using two main ingredients -the first is the posets constructed section 4.2, giving us the buttons and an "almost" n-switch, and the second is the n-switch of proposition 4.11. To work with the buttons, we also required that all extensions of W will be appropriate. Assuming this, once we had an n-switch, we did not use it's specific construction in defining the labeling. So in fact we have the following: Theorem 5.1. Let W the model constructed in section 4.1 and Γ a class of forcing notions with the following properties:
(1) Γ is reflexive, transitive and persistent; (2) Every extension of W by a Γ-forcing is appropriate; (3) All posets constructed in section 4.2 are in Γ; (4) There is an n-switch for Γ-forcing over W for any n. Then MLF (Γ) = S4.2. Now let's see what was needed to obtain the n-switch of proposition 4.11. We relied heavily on the c.c.c of all posets in question; we used all posets coding subsets of ω 1 , as well as products of at most ℵ 1 of them; we relied on the fact that σ-centered posets cannot enlarge 2 ℵ0 or 2 ℵ1 ; we used the fact that there were (in W ) only ℵ 2 σ-centered posets up to equivalence, and that they were all already in the smaller model Z. So, this construction can be carried with any class of forcing notions satisfying these requirements. To conclude:
Theorem 5.2. Let Γ be a class of forcing notions with the following properties:
(1) Γ is reflexive, transitive and persistent; (2) Every extension of W by a Γ-forcing is appropriate; Remark. Conditions 3 and 4.4 will hold for any class containing all σ-centered forcing notions. Definition 5.3. A subset C ⊆ P is called n-linked if any n elements of C are compatible, i.e. have a common extension (perhaps not in C itself). 2-linked is also called simply linked. A poset is called σ-n-linked if it is the union of ω many n-linked subsets. Again, σ-linked means σ-2-linked.
It is clear that we have the following implications:
σ-centered → σ-n-linked for every n → σ-n-linked → σ-linked and it is known that the other directions do not hold (cf. [1] ). So the classes of all forcing notions satisfying one of these properties contain the class of σ-centered posets. We observe that in the proofs of lemmas 3.5 and 3.10, we actually only used the fact that the posets were σ-linked rather than strictly σ-centered. So each of these classes preserve the continuum function, each such poset is equivalent to a poset of size at most 2 ℵ0 , and the class itself has size at most 2 2 ℵ 0 (up to equivalence). Additionally, one can see that the proofs of lemmas 3.6 (the strong productivity of the class) and 3.8 (the transitivity of the class) can be applied, mutatis mutandis, to the classes of σ-n-linked posets for some n or the class of posets which are σ-n-linked for every n. These classes are also clearly persistent, so they satisfy all the conditions of theorem 5.2, thus we obtain the following: Corollary 5.4. Let Γ be either the class of all σ-n-linked posets (for some fixed n), or the class of all posets which are σ-n-linked for every n. Then MLF (Γ) = S4.2.
Parallel to this hierarchy of properties, we can define the following hierarchy (cf. [1] ):
Definition 5.5.
(1) Given n ∈ ω, P has property K n if every A ⊆ [P] ℵ1 contains an uncountable n-linked subset. K 2 is also called the Knaster property.
(2) P has pre-caliber ω 1 if every A ⊆ [P]
ℵ1 contains an uncountable centered subset.
Note that pre-caliber ω 1 implies property K n , and K n implies K m for m ≤ n. So these form a hierarchy of properties. Furthermore, if P is σ-centered then it has pre-caliber ω 1 , and if it is σ-n-linked then it has property K n . So we get the following implications:
σ-centered / / ( ( P P P P P P P P P P P P P ∀n (σ-n-linked) / / σ-n-linked / / σ-2-linked
Let the property P be either pre-caliber ω 1 or K n for some n, and denote by Γ P the class of all P-forcing notions. Then one can verify that Γ P is reflexive, transitive and persistent (hence directed), so MLF (Γ P ) ⊇ S4.2. Furthermore, it contains all σ-centered forcings, so it would be natural to try and generalize our results to this parallel hierarchy. However, note that for every I, the poset Fn (I, 2) consisting of finite functions from I to 2, ordered by reverse inclusion, has pre-caliber ω 1 (cf. [11, pg. 181]), and for |I| > 2
ℵ0
it adds |I| new reals, so it does not preserve the continuum function. So extensions of W using such forcings may not be appropriate. We can however get some limited result. Note that the coding of the reals a α,i can be started as high as we want, so if we limit ourselves to forcing notions of a bounded size, we can do this coding somewhere high enough that will not be affected by these forcings. So we can proceed with this the labeling, if we show that there is some n-switch to label the top cluster with. Since these forcings do not preserve the continuum, we cannot obtain an n-switch for these classes using the same methods. However, there is a very natural n-switch for any class of c.c.c forcings which contain all forcings of the form Fn (I, 2): the statements 2 ℵ0 ≥ ℵ α form a ratchet, since in any extension of the ground model, using an appropriate I, we can always increase the size of the continuum, and by c.c.c it will not drop. If we bound the size of the forcings appropriately, this would be a strong ratchet, and we can construct an n-switch as in lemma 2.15. So all the conditions of theorem 5.1 can be met, hence we have the following: Corollary 5.6. Let P be either pre-caliber ω 1 or K n for some n and Γ P the class of all P-forcing notions of some bounded size. Then MLF (Γ P ) = S4.2 .
However, to deal with all P-forcings at the same time would require a different method, so the following is open: Question 5.7. Let P be either pre-caliber ω 1 or K n for some n . What is the modal logic of all P-forcing notions?
To conclude, the only property in the above diagram we did not discuss yet is c.c.c. This natural question was already raised in [6] . The difficulty in answering it is that the class of all c.c.c forcing notions is not directed, so it does not contain S4.2. It is reflexive and transitive, so Hamkins and Löwe conjectured that the answer is S4. To prove this, one would probably need to find a labeling for models based on trees, as the class of all trees is a class of simple frames characterizing S4. It should be mentioned that in [7] , a labeling of models based frames which are "spiked pre-Boolean algebras" (cf. [7] for exact definition) was provided, thus establishing an upper bound which is strictly between S4 and S4.2. However it is not known whether this modal theory is finitely axiomatizable, so it is not yet clear whether this can be shown to be a lower bound as well by the current methods. So, this question remains open. R
